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The Supreme Court has said that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution and Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination require that all 
persons be treated as individuals and that the laws operate primarily to 
protect “persons, not groups.” This article shows that the legal 
requirement of individual treatment has two distinct components: a rule 
invalidating inferences about persons based on their membership in 
protected groups and a rule prohibiting disparate treatment for the sake 
of group interests or intergroup equality. The first rule is rooted in moral 
principles of respect for individual autonomy. The second rule is a 
principle that gives lexical priority to individual rights over group 
welfare. Both are formal, anti-classification rules that abjure reliance on 
group concerns, and both are central to antidiscrimination law. Neither 
rule, however, mandates group-blindness or entails the categorical 
irrelevance of group classifications. Antidiscrimination law cannot be 
completely understood without reference to goals of substantive 
intergroup equality. The rules of individual treatment and the protection 
of “persons, not groups” represent formal constraints on the means by 
which substantive equality can be sought. They should not be mistaken 
as substitutes for it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Given certain social conditions, treating racial groups differently 
could increase equality and efficiency. For example, if two racial groups 
in a society have unequal representation in a selective college, and if 
this inequality is unjust, an obvious way to reverse this inequality would 
be to reserve a certain number of seats in each class for the 
underrepresented group. Or, if members of one racial group engage in 
a particular unwanted illegal behavior at a much higher rate than 
members of another group, and if the government has limited resources 
to police that behavior, efficiency would seem to dictate expending 
more resources on monitoring members of the racial group that 
exhibits the higher rate of the unwanted behavior. Similarly, if valid 
statistics show that members of one racial group perform better at a 
particular employment-relevant task than members of another, 
efficiency might likewise support giving preference to the higher-
performing group in selective hiring processes. 
But, of course, antidiscrimination law prohibits or places significant 
constraints on these sorts of “obvious” solutions. It is illegal to remedy 
racially disproportionate representation in university student bodies 
through outright racial rebalancing or quota-based selection 
procedures.1 Racial profiling, at least in its crudest form, arguably 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.2 And employment practices 
cannot be based on generalizations – even empirically supportable 
ones – about work-related attributes of members of a particular racial 
group.3 
In general, our antidiscrimination frameworks, especially in the 
context of race, make it problematic to pick out individuals for different 
treatment based solely on the justification that this would increase 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality) (Powell, J.). 
 2.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (dictum) (“[T]he Constitution 
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.”); United States 
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2000). But cf. United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (holding that border officials do not violate Fourth Amendment 
by considering the “apparent Mexican ancestry” of a vehicle’s occupants as a factor in requiring 
the vehicle to pull over to a secondary inspection area). 
 3.  See L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (invalidating sex-
differentiated pension contribution requirements based on statistical data showing that women 
live longer than men); cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (holding that 
employer cannot make generalizations about behavior based on sex); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 
429, 433 (1984) (suggesting that the “reality” of a race-based disadvantage does not make it a 
valid reason for decision making). See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” 
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 851–52 (2003). 
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intergroup equality, or on the basis of generalizations about a particular 
group’s behavior. As the Supreme Court has said, both the Equal 
Protection Clause and the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII 
operate to protect “persons, not groups.”4 Antidiscrimination law 
frowns upon regarding persons as merely fungible instances of the 
groups to which they belong and requires instead that persons be 
treated “as individuals”5 and be given “individualized consideration”6 
in decisions involving differential distributions of benefits and burdens. 
This article examines the Supreme Court’s notion of the right to be 
treated as an individual rather than as a member of a group. What 
exactly does this right require or prohibit? What normative or moral 
commitments does the right embody? In Part I, I explain why the law’s 
prioritization of persons over groups cannot be reduced to a simple rule 
of “group blindness” dictating the absolute irrelevance of group 
membership to individual treatment. In Part II, I survey some of the 
cases in which the idea of protecting individuals has been invoked, and 
I tease out two distinct concerns that animate the Court’s insistence on 
treating persons as individuals. In Part III, I propose two principles that 
capture those concerns. In Part IV, I develop an account of individual 
treatment rooted in the moral values of respect for autonomy and the 
inviolability of rights and show how these values can explain certain 
shared intuitions and legal doctrines in controversial contexts such as 
racial profiling and affirmative action. I conclude with some 
observations about the role and significance of the notion of individual 
treatment within the broader context of antidiscrimination law as a 
whole. 
I.  AVOIDING OVERSTATEMENT OF THE IRRELEVANCE OF GROUPS 
The ideas that all persons have a right to be treated as individuals 
rather than as members of groups and that antidiscrimination law 
protects persons, not groups might at first suggest a broad rule that all 
group classifications must be disregarded in determining the treatment 
 
 4.  In the constitutional context, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742–43 (2007); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 
(1948). In the Title VII context, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Manhart, 435 U.S. 
at 702. 
 5.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (Equal Protection Clause); Ariz. Governing 
Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983) (Title VII) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708). 
 6.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336; see Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 638 
(1987). 
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to which a person is entitled. What is meant by treatment as an 
individual rather than as a member of a group, one might hypothesize, 
is that groups and group classifications are always irrelevant to the 
operation of our antidiscrimination laws, and that a person’s 
membership in a particular group can never be regarded as a relevant 
reason for giving a benefit to or imposing a burden on a person. But 
this would prove too much. Whatever the right to individual treatment 
means, it cannot plausibly be interpreted as a commitment to absolute 
group blindness. 
As a descriptive matter, antidiscrimination law does not in fact 
disallow the use of all group classifications. Group classifications are 
pervasive, and most do not trigger any legal concern whatsoever. There 
is nothing objectionable, for example, about a university admissions 
policy that automatically rejects all applicants who failed to complete 
high school. No one would raise an individual treatment objection to a 
singing group’s exclusion of all people who are tone-deaf. Any process 
of selection based on discernible criteria necessarily entails 
classification of people by groups defined by the operative criteria.7 
Because reliance on group classifications is inherent to any selection 
process, the right to be treated as an individual cannot be interpreted 
to mean that a person’s treatment can never be based on consideration 
of group membership.8 
One might reply that the idea of treating persons as individuals 
rather than on the basis of their group membership should be 
interpreted to prohibit only actions based on irrelevant group 
classifications. But this, too, will not work. If an employer decided to act 
on “an irrational animus against people who are six feet tall, who are 
from St. Louis, or who root for the Blue Devils,”9 it is unlikely that 
antidiscrimination law as it exists today would have anything to say 
about it. Title VII law does not contain any general prohibition against 
reliance on irrelevant group classifications,10 and any such general 
constraints imposed by rational-basis review under the Equal 
 
 7.  See Ronald Dworkin, Bakke’s Case: Are Quotas Unfair?, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
DEBATE 109 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 2002). 
 8.  See BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 134 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2015); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 19 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 125–26 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (arguing that equality principles do not forbid 
classificatory judgments per se, and “almost all classifications involve ‘groups’” of some kind). 
 9.  Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 846. 
 10.  See id.  
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Protection Clause are weak at best.11 Thus, the idea of treatment as an 
individual cannot accurately be formulated as a principle that dictates 
the irrelevance of group classifications nor as a principle that prohibits 
reliance on group classifications that are irrelevant. 
A less sweeping approach that is closer to the truth would 
conceptualize the requirement of individual treatment as a principle 
dictating the legal irrelevance of a selected set of group classifications 
of which the law has good reason to be wary. Both Title VII and the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional equality jurisprudence presuppose that 
some group classifications – those that have either been recognized as 
constitutionally suspect or are specifically enumerated in Title VII and 
other antidiscrimination statutes – have greater significance than 
others, for various reasons.12 Although antidiscrimination law cannot 
be interpreted to require that all group classifications be disregarded, it 
does seem to say that these “enumerated” group classifications must be 
regarded as irrelevant in selective processes that pick out individuals 
for preferential or adverse treatment.13 
Recognizing that antidiscrimination law requires some but not all 
group classifications to be regarded as irrelevant does not prove, 
however, that the law is blind to the interests of groups defined by the 
enumerated classifications. On the contrary, the fact that 
antidiscrimination law dictates irrelevance for only a select set of 
enumerated group classifications strongly suggests that group-based 
concerns are relevant to the purposes of the law itself.14 The ascription 
of categorical irrelevance to some classifications but not others is 
justified by concerns about the groups bearing those classifications. For 
example, antidiscrimination law goes out of its way to forbid 
consideration of membership in racial groups but not other 
classifications that might be just as irrelevant (e.g., height, eye color) or 
 
 11.  See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895 (2016).  
 12.  Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 846; see also Patrick S. Shin, Is There a Unitary Concept 
of Discrimination?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (Deborah 
Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013). 
 13.  In other writings, I have used the term “enumerated factors” to refer to the group 
classifications that are singled out by positive federal antidiscrimination law for special scrutiny – 
which would include at least race, color, religion, sex, national origin. See Shin, supra note 12, at 
167. 
 14.  For a very similar point, see William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional 
Roles: The Fate of the Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means For Congressional Power 
to Enforce Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 36 (2009) (arguing that while the Supreme 
Court has insisted on the “personal” nature of equal protection rights, “standard equal protection 
law does in fact turn on groups, or at least on the classification traits (such as race and gender) 
that define group membership”). 
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consideration of which might exacerbate existing injustices (e.g., 
socioeconomic status). Why? The most plausible justification is that the 
enumerated classifications pick out categories of persistent unjust 
inequality that afflict our society and, because of their social and 
psychological salience, require special monitoring.15 In short, the law’s 
prohibition of treatment on the basis of race is a response to, and an 
attempt to rectify, actual and potential racial injustice and inequality. 
Antidiscrimination law’s selective prohibition of group classifications 
is thus predicated upon concerns about particular groups in our society. 
In summary, the right to be treated as an individual rather than as a 
member of a group is not a general right against treatment on the basis 
of group classification, but rather a right not be treated on the basis of 
any of the legally enumerated classifications. The justification of the 
enumerated classification approach is itself based on group-based 
concerns, such as the existence of unjust inequality among racial groups. 
Thus, the right to be treated as an individual is in part a function of such 
group concerns, rather than a rejection of their normative significance. 
The important upshot is that although the right to be treated as an 
individual imposes constraints on how the law can address concerns of 
comparative group welfare and inequality, that right cannot be asserted 
as a basis for repudiating such concerns. 
II.  THE TWO CONCERNS UNDERLYING THE RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL 
TREATMENT 
If the right to be treated as an individual is not reducible to a 
rejection of group-based concerns, then what exactly are the normative 
commitments underlying that right? In this section, I tease apart two 
distinct ideas that tend to be packed together within the common 
dictum that every person has a right to be treated as an individual 
rather than as a member of a group. Identifying these somewhat 
different concerns will help clarify the values that lie beneath this right. 
The first concern tends to arise in connection with actions that 
involve the use of generalizations about a prohibited group as a basis 
for the treatment of a particular individual. This category of actions 
would include racial stereotyping,16 the consideration of race as a proxy 
for work-relevant attributes (“statistical discrimination”),17 the 
 
 15.  See Shin, supra note 12, at 169–72; see also Tommie Shelby, Race and Ethnicity, Race 
and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1707 (2004). 
 16.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).  
 17.  See generally David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
SHIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016 5:41 PM 
2016] INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT & PROTECTING PERSONS OVER GROUPS 113 
conflation of racial group membership with particular viewpoints or 
political preferences,18 and racial profiling.19 The concern typically 
expressed about such actions is that they fail to respect persons as 
individuals, treating them as if they were nothing more than “the 
product of their race.”20 Consider, for example, the well known case of 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart.21 In Manhart, 
the employer implemented a policy requiring female employees to 
make larger pension contributions than male employees, based on 
actuarial statistics that showed that women generally live longer than 
men and hence would be likely to receive higher total payouts from the 
pension fund.22 The Court invalidated the sex-differentiated pension 
policy, asserting that under Title VII, “employment decisions cannot be 
predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the characteristics 
of males or females.”23 It held that the law “precludes treatment of 
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or 
national class” and, therefore, “[e]ven a true generalization about the 
class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom 
the generalization does not apply.”24 The rule that emerges from 
Manhart and similar cases is that the treatment of a person should not 
be based on a likelihood that the person fits a generalization – even if 
the generalization is statistically supportable – about the racial or 
gender group (or other enumerated class) to which the person belongs. 
The second distinct concern contained in the idea of treatment as 
an individual rather than as a member of a group arises in a slightly 
different category of disputed treatment. This second category includes 
the use of quotas or quota-like mechanisms to increase minority 
 
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991). Strauss defines 
statistical discrimination as “the use of race as a proxy for characteristics related to productivity.” 
Id. at 1639; see also Bagenstos, supra note 3. 
 18.  See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 621 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 911, 911–912 (1995). 
 19.  I employ the term “racial profiling” in this article to refer to the law enforcement 
practice of focusing investigative resources on individuals of a particular race, based on statistical 
evidence (valid or spurious) that members of that racial group are more likely than non-members 
to engage in criminal activity. Cf. EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 178.  
 20.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 912 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 604 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 21.  435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 22.  See id. 
 23.  Id. at 707. 
 24.  Id. at 708. 
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presence,25 contested forms of affirmative action,26 and attempts to 
justify race-conscious action by appeal to group consequences.27 For 
example, in Connecticut v. Teal,28 two minority employees had failed a 
written examination used by the employer as a qualifying step for 
eligibility for promotion to the position of supervisor. The plaintiffs 
challenged the employer’s use of the examination on a Title VII 
disparate impact theory.29 The employer’s response was that any racial 
disparate impact created by the written exam was more than 
counterbalanced by the fact that the employer promoted minorities on 
the eligibility list at a significantly higher rate than whites, resulting in 
an absence of disparate impact at the “bottom line.”30 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Brennan rejected the employer’s argument, asserting 
that “[t]he principal focus of the statute is the protection of the 
individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group 
as a whole.”31 
Another case that provides an example of the second concern is 
Parents Involved.32 There, in response to Justice Breyer’s argument that 
the race-conscious school assignment policy at issue could be justified33 
on the grounds that the policy would “improve conditions of race”34 
and help bring about the integration of racial groups,35 Chief Justice 
Roberts asserted that these group-based consequences were not valid 
reasons for giving preferred school assignments to particular 
individuals on the basis of race.36 Putting racial classifications to use for 
the purpose of group benefits would be “fundamentally at odds,” he 
wrote, with the clearly established rule that the Constitution protects 
“persons, not groups.”37 The second concern underlying the idea of the 
right to be treated as an individual, then, is that a person’s treatment 
 
 25.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring).  
 26.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 27.  See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1982); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 
(1948). 
 28.  457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 29.  See id. at 444, 446–47. 
 30.  See id. at 453. 
 31.  Id. at 453–54. 
 32.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 33.  Or at least should not be subjected to constitutional strict scrutiny. 
 34.  See id. at 828 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 35.  See id. at 828–29. 
 36.  See id. at 742–43. 
 37.  Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (italics in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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cannot be justified solely based on the expected consequences for 
group welfare or equality. 
In short, the two concerns that animate the idea of treatment as an 
individual are (1) a concern about people being treated differently on 
the basis of inferences derived from their membership in enumerated 
groups; and (2) a concern about the subordination of individual rights 
to the collective interests of an enumerated group or to considerations 
of intergroup equality. 
III.  THE PRINCIPLES OF INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION AND 
INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY 
In this section, I attempt to crystallize the two concerns discussed 
in section II into two specific principles that jointly embody the right 
to be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a group. As 
discussed in section I, these principles do not require absolute group-
blindness. Rather, they reflect the law’s actual approach: selective 
ascription of irrelevance to certain enumerated classifications, namely, 
the group classifications listed in Title VII and suspect classifications in 
the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. And, 
pursuant to the discussion in section II, the principles give expression 
to both an anti-generalization concern and a concern about the 
subordination of individual to group interests. 
The first proposed principle says that people should not be treated 
adversely or preferentially on the basis of generalizations about the 
enumerated groups to which they may belong. In other words, people 
are entitled to consideration as individual persons, not as fungible 
tokens of any suspect class. This idea, which I will label the Principle of 
Individual Consideration, can be formulated as follows: 
Individual Consideration. Adverse or preferential treatment of a 
person cannot be justified by an inference about the person derived 
from the person’s membership in an enumerated group. 
The second principle is one that emphasizes the priority of the 
individual over concerns pertaining to the welfare of an enumerated 
group or the promotion of intergroup equality. I believe that this is the 
principle that animates the slogan that the law protects “persons, not 
groups.” This second principle, which I will refer to as the Principle of 
Individual Priority, can be articulated as follows: 
 
 
SHIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016 5:41 PM 
116 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:1 
Individual Priority. Adverse or preferential treatment of a person 
cannot be justified by an expectation that such treatment would 
benefit an enumerated group or would improve or not worsen 
conditions of equality between such groups. 
These two principles, when combined, give content to the right to 
be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a group, as well 
as the notion that antidiscrimination law primarily protects persons, not 
groups.38 I will refer to the compound principle comprised by merging 
the Principles of Individual Consideration and of Individual Priority as 
the Principle of Treatment as an Individual, which can be stated like 
this: 
Treatment as an Individual. Adverse or preferential treatment of a 
person cannot be justified by (1) an inference about the person 
derived from the person’s membership in an enumerated group; or 
(2) an expectation that such treatment would benefit an enumerated 
group or would improve or not worsen conditions of equality 
between such groups. 
The general Principle of Treatment as an Individual can be 
narrowed in particular contexts of group classification. For example, in 
the specific context of racial classification, the Principle of Treatment 
as an Individual might be formulated in the following way: 
Treatment as an Individual Without Regard to Race. Adverse or 
preferential treatment of a person cannot be justified by (1) an 
inference about the person derived from the person’s race; or (2) an 
expectation that such treatment would benefit members of some 
racial group or would improve or not worsen conditions of equality 
between racial groups. 
To limit the scope of the discussion in the remainder of this article, 
my focus in the sections below will be on the Principle of Treatment as 
an Individual Without Regard to Race, and my arguments will be based 
in part on examples and problems that are somewhat specific to the 
domain of racial classification. Where the context is otherwise clear, I 
will refer to the race-specific version of the principle simply as the 
Principle of Treatment as an Individual. Although I believe that the 
conclusions that I draw from my discussion in the context of race 
 
 38.  I do not claim that these principles exhaust the legal concept of discrimination. For 
example, intentionally harming someone because of pure racial hatred would surely count as 
discrimination, even if the act’s rationale did not violate either of these principles. My goal in this 
article is not to define discrimination generally but rather to examine one particular 
antidiscrimination concept, the principle of individual treatment, especially as invoked to 
constrain actions that are putatively rational. 
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should apply more generally to contexts involving other enumerated 
classifications, I leave open whether the principle is more or less 
plausible in the context of race than in the contexts of sex, religion, 
national origin, and other enumerated classifications. 
IV.  EXPLORING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO 
TREATMENT AS AN INDIVIDUAL 
As discussed in Section II, the Supreme Court regularly asserts the 
Principle of Treatment as an Individual (or its individual components) 
as an axiom of antidiscrimination law. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the normative foundations of the Principle, I test its 
application in two contexts: the use of racial classifications in law 
enforcement activities and race-based affirmative action. In each 
context, I consider potential counterexamples, i.e., examples of 
treatment that arguably violate the Principle but are nevertheless 
permissible under existing law.39 By reflecting on the substantive moral 
distinctions between these apparent counterexamples and actions that 
are more clearly prohibited, I attempt to shed light on the substantive 
values that underlie the Principle’s verbiage. 
A.  Racial Profiling v. Racialized Suspect Description 
An important problem for discrimination theory is distinguishing 
between the objectionable use of “racial profiling” in law enforcement 
and the common practice of using race in the context of criminal 
suspect descriptions.40 Most people would agree that the former 
constitutes wrongful discrimination, but the latter does not.41 Consider 
two hypothetical cases. 
 
“Profile.” While investigating a drug trafficking operation, law 
enforcement officers receive a tip that two tall males have been sent 
as couriers to pick up a shipment of drugs at a crowded train station. 
The tip does not contain information about the race of the couriers, 
but reliable historical evidence shows that most persons who engage 
in this kind of work in the relevant region are of a particular 
 
 39.  Such cases would be counterexamples to the claim that the Principle of Treatment as an 
Individual accurately represents existing antidiscrimination law. 
 40.  For citations to key articles in the literature, see EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 246–47 nn.7–
8. 
 41.  See id. at 186; R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal 
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1083–88 (2001). 
SHIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016 5:41 PM 
118 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:1 
minority race. On the basis of that evidence, officers focus their 
investigative efforts at the train station by stopping and questioning 
all tall males matching that racial profile.42 
“Suspect Description.”43 A violent crime has just been reported. 
Police officers arrive at the scene and separately interview the 
victim and multiple witnesses. Each person interviewed credibly 
states that the perpetrator, who has fled the area, was a tall white 
male. Based on these descriptions, the officers limit their subsequent 
search for the perpetrator to tall males matching that racial 
description.44 
The officers in Profile are clearly violating the anti-generalization 
component of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual (the Principle 
of Individual Consideration) with respect to the people they stop at the 
train station. In picking out members of the minority racial group for 
questioning, they assume that those individuals are more likely than 
others, merely by virtue of their racial group membership, to be 
engaged in illegal drug trafficking. They are thus subjecting those 
individuals to adverse treatment based on an inference derived from 
their race. 
It is less clear what to say about the officers in Suspect Description. 
One might argue that they have eliminated non-whites from suspicion 
merely because such individuals conclusively fail to satisfy the minimal 
conditions for membership in the class of potential suspects, not 
because of some inference about them derived from their race; and one 
might say, by the same token, that whites remain included in the class 
of potential suspects only insofar as there is no conclusive reason to 
exclude them from that class, not because of some further race-based 
inference about them. Yet, even though all of that would be true, it is 
also true that the officers in Suspect Description, like the officers in 
Profile, take race into consideration in making determinations about 
whom to investigate. Indeed, the officers in Suspect Description are 
making an inference45 that non-white persons cannot be the 
 
 42.  This scenario is a variation of a hypothetical case described in The National Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Restoring a National Consensus: the Need to End Racial 
Profiling in America 7 (March 2011), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/ reports/racial-
profiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf. 
 43.  This term has also been used by others. See, e.g., EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 178; 
Priyamvada Sinha, Police Use of Race in Suspect Descriptions: Constitutional Considerations, 31 
NYU REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 131 (2006); Banks, supra note 41, at 1077. 
 44.  Cf. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 45.  In the hypothetical, the inference is nearly a deductive one. In real-life cases, the 
inference would be more probabilistic due to the fallible nature of eyewitness testimony and 
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perpetrator; and this inference is certainly derived from their race. Thus, 
insofar as the officers are excluding non-whites from suspicion based 
on their race, they are treating them preferentially based on an 
inference derived from their race. This appears to be a literal violation 
of the individual consideration prong of the Principle of Treatment as 
an Individual. 
According to the Principle of Treatment as an Individual, then, both 
the officers in Profile and Suspect Description are engaged in 
objectionable discriminatory conduct. Yet, the two cases do not seem 
equivalent, and most people would find Profile more problematic than 
Suspect Description.46 Assuming that the officers’ conduct in Suspect 
Description is legally permissible, the case is a counterexample to the 
individual consideration prong of the Principle of Treatment as an 
Individual, insofar as that principle purports to fit existing law. The 
question, then, is why. Is there some deeper principle or value that 
explains why the law should permit the conduct in Suspect Description 
while prohibiting the conduct in Profile? If so, this deeper value could 
provide a more robust understanding of antidiscrimination law’s 
requirement that persons be treated as individuals. 
Some helpful guidance can be found in the work of Benjamin 
Eidelson on the meaning of treating people as individuals.47 We can 
draw profitably on a pair of hypotheticals crafted by Eidelson that I 
think are worth recounting here. In his first example, Sally, an Asian 
student who happens to be a mediocre violinist, auditions for her school 
orchestra. Although she does poorly in her audition, Kevin, the 
orchestra director, selects Sally anyway, assuming that she is just having 
a bad day; and Eidelson stipulates that Kevin would not have made this 
same assumption but for Sally’s race.48 In Eidelson’s second case, Mark, 
a young Black law firm associate who happens to have an interest in 
wine tasting, goes to lunch with his firm mentor, Jane. During the lunch, 
Jane brings up the firm’s basketball team (in which Mark has no 
interest) but does not mention the firm’s wine tasting club; and it is 
 
considerations of that kind. For purposes of my analysis, I shall stipulate that there is no 
reasonable basis to doubt the reliability of the racial identification in Suspect Description.  
 46.  See EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 178; Banks, supra note 41, at 1083. 
 47.  Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013). The idea of treating 
a person as an individual is an important component of Eidelson’s broader theory of 
discrimination, which he develops in his book, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT. See 
EIDELSON, supra note 8. 
 48.  See Eidelson, supra note 47, at 205. 
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stipulated, again, that Jane would have done just the opposite – 
mentioning the wine club but not the basketball team – if Mark had 
been white.49 
Eidelson suggests that we have reason to criticize both Kevin and 
Jane in the race-based assumptions that they make about Sally and 
Mark, respectively, and he argues that the particular criticism we would 
be justified in making is that they both have failed to take Sally and 
Mark seriously as individuals.50 The failure to treat Sally and Mark as 
individuals, Eidelson explains, is not reducible to a mere error of 
reasoning or simple unfairness. Rather, not treating someone as an 
individual means failing to give reasonable consideration to that 
person’s history of autonomous choices (the person’s “character”) or 
“disparaging” that person’s capacity to make future autonomous 
choices (the person’s “agency”).51 Treating people as individuals means 
“respect[ing] the role they can play and have played in shaping 
themselves, rather than treating them as determined by demographic 
categories or other matters of statistical fate.”52 In other words, Kevin 
and Jane fail to see Sally and Mark as individuals in that they regard 
them as predictable functions of the racialized social forces to which 
they have been subjected, rather than as autonomous actors who 
impose their own choices over time on the social contexts they occupy. 
Eidelson’s account of what it means to treat someone as an 
individual helps explain a key difference between racial profiling and 
suspect description.53 Racial profiling in law enforcement, as typically 
characterized, involves imposing higher levels of legal monitoring and 
scrutiny on individuals of one race relative to another, based on an 
assumption that individuals of the targeted race are more likely in the 
aggregate to engage in law breaking activity.54 This assumption is 
inconsistent with respect for the autonomy of the individuals burdened 
by the practice. Using racial classification as a predictor of action 
 
 49.  See id. at 205–06. 
 50.  See id. at 208. 
 51.  See id. at 215–16. 
 52.  Id. at 216; EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 145. 
 53.  Surprisingly, Eidelson’s own explanation of the moral difference between profiling and 
suspect description does not rely on his discussion of what it means to treat someone as an 
individual. Rather, Eidelson argues that racial profiling is morally wrong because it causes a broad 
array of personal and social harms. See EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 197–219. My view is that the 
key wrong-making feature of racial profiling is the disrespect expressed by that conduct, 
regardless of any actual personal or social harm it may bring about. 
 54.  See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 191; Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial 
Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 131, 136, 144 (2004). 
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implies that people are, to the extent predicted, a function of their race. 
Imposing burdens on a person because of an imputed, race-linked 
likelihood of criminal behavior is tantamount to a rejection of that 
person’s capacity to make autonomous individual choices. 
What, then, is the moral difference between Profile and Suspect 
Description? We cannot simply say that race is an irrelevant factor in 
Profile because the race of the potential suspects is unknown, whereas 
it is relevant in Suspect Description because the race of the suspect is 
known. The Profile hypothetical stipulates facts that arguably make 
race a relevant factor in the officers’ decision about how to focus their 
investigatory efforts. Of course, if a practice of racial profiling were 
based on factually irrelevant considerations of race or undertaken in 
bad faith, then it would surely be wrong for that reason as well.55 The 
question of interest, however, is why racial profiling should be 
problematic even when it might offer a rational or efficient method56 of 
making the most of limited law enforcement resources.57 
The moral objection to racial profiling based on the failure to 
respect autonomy provides an answer to this question. This objection 
does not depend on an irrelevance argument. Racial profiling would be 
objectionable on grounds of failure to respect autonomy even if we 
could rule out bad faith and bias, and even if the correlation between 
racial group membership and unlawful behavior was statistically valid. 
To be sure, if one accepts the argument that racial profiling violates the 
right to be treated as an autonomous individual, one might conclude 
that antidiscrimination law requires race to be treated as an irrelevant 
consideration in cases like Profile. But this would be a legally 
constructed irrelevance. We ascribe irrelevance to race in cases of racial 
profiling because we are committed to the requirement of treating 
persons as autonomous individuals—even if the available evidence 
could justify our believing that members of a particular group were 
indeed more likely to engage in particular conduct.58 
 
 
 55.  See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious 
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1046 (2010). 
 56.  See Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 144. 
 57.  For a concise explanation of how consideration of race based on statistical evidence 
could be economically rational even in the absence of discriminatory “tastes,” see Kenneth J. 
Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 91, 96 
(1998).  
 58.  Cf. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 119. 
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But if we ascribe irrelevance to race in Profile, why not also in 
Suspect Description? The difference is that the consideration of race in 
Suspect Description does not require a repudiation of any person’s 
autonomy. In Suspect Description, race is a fact associated with a 
particular person alleged to have committed a specific datable act;59 
and it is a fact that aids in picking out the person who committed that 
act from a larger group of potential suspects. But the act whose 
perpetrator is being sought in Suspect Description is not regarded as 
though it were a statistical function of anyone’s race. Rather, race 
serves only as a criterion for determining whether a given suspect and 
the perpetrator are one and the same person. 
Like racial profiling, racialized suspect descriptions can allow 
criminal investigators to do their work more quickly and efficiently 
while minimizing the imposition of burdens on innocent parties. But 
unlike racial profiling, the use of racialized suspect descriptions does 
not involve treating any persons as though their actions were 
determined by their race. The focusing of suspicion on people who fit 
the racialized suspect description does not necessarily involve an 
autonomy-displacing inference from race to action. It is based, instead 
on an inference from the observed race of the perpetrator to a 
conclusion that people of other races cannot be that perpetrator. Thus, 
the racialized investigation Suspect Description does not involve a 
failure to treat anyone as an individual under Eidelson’s criteria: it does 
not imply any disparagement of individual autonomy nor disregard 
anyone’s history of past choices or capacity to make future choices. 
Although both racial profiling and the use of race in suspect 
descriptions seem to violate the individual consideration prong of the 
Principle of Treatment as an Individual, they are distinguishable from 
the standpoint of the requirement of respecting autonomy. This 
suggests that an important substantive commitment underlying 
antidiscrimination law’s demand of individual treatment is that all 
persons be respected as individual moral agents capable of making 
autonomous choices not dictated by their race. 
 
 59.  One could alter the facts of Suspect Description to involve a concrete threat of a future 
criminal act without turning it into a case of racial profiling. We could imagine, for example, a 
scenario in which police receive a reliable report that two Latina women will rob a particular bank 
tomorrow, and police focus their search for the would-be robbers on Latinas. The case would still 
be one of suspect description rather than racial profiling so long as the purpose of investigation 
remains on finding particular suspects who are in the process of attempting a specific datable 
criminal act. 
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B.  The Contested Nature of Affirmative Action 
We can gain further insight into the Principle of Treatment as an 
Individual—including the individual priority component—by 
examining a context of controversy in which those ideas have been 
invoked with great regularity: race-based affirmative action, i.e., the 
preferential treatment of members of certain racial groups in selection 
processes in university admissions and employment. In this section, I 
explore the extent to which the Principle of Individual Consideration 
and of Individual Priority help us understand antidiscrimination law’s 
approach to affirmative action and the nature of the disagreement 
about its justification. 
First, I address one particularly aggressive version of the argument 
that affirmative action violates the Principle of Treatment as an 
Individual. This argument says that there is a moral and legal 
equivalence between race-based affirmative action on the one hand 
and racial profiling in law enforcement on the other:60 “affirmative 
action and racial profiling are essentially the same.”61 The claim is that 
although their purposes might seem different insofar as “one [policy] 
singles out blacks for something desirable and the other singles them 
out for something undesirable,”62 they are equally objectionable 
because both policies involve treating a person based on assumptions 
or generalizations derived from the person’s membership in a racial 
group.63 Thus, the argument goes, affirmative action, no less than racial 
profiling, fails to satisfy the law’s demand that every person must be 
respected as an individual.64 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, it helps itself to a 
particular theory of the justification of affirmative action that many 
might reject. Second, it mistakenly assumes that granting someone a 
 
 60.  See Ilya Somin, Affirmative Action and Racial Profiling Revisited, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (May 8, 2010), http://volokh.com/2010/05/08/affirmative-action-and-racial-
profiling-revisited (arguing that affirmative action and racial profiling are open to similar 
objections); see also Richard H. Schuck, Assessing Affirmative Action, 20 NAT’L AFF. 76, 90 
(2014). 
 61.  Michael Brus, Proxy War, in JUSTICE: A READER (Michael Sandel ed., 2007). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See id. (“[I]t’s safe to say that anyone who is outraged by racial profiling but tolerates 
affirmative action, or vice versa, has got it wrong.”). 
 64.  Victor C. Romero, Critical Race Theory in Three Acts: Racial Profiling, Affirmative 
Action, and the Diversity Visa Lottery, 66 ALBANY L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2003) (asserting that “the 
use of race in law enforcement” and race-based affirmative action in higher education can be seen 
as “aspects of a single, broader concept called racial profiling”). Romero ultimately argues, 
however, that race-based affirmative action can be distinguished from racial profiling in law 
enforcement by appeal to considerations of substantive racial justice. See id. at 385–86. 
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preference because of race necessarily entails a failure to treat the 
person as an individual. 
The first fallacy in the argument that affirmative action and racial 
profiling are the same is that it assumes that affirmative action can only 
have one possible rationale. But this is not the case. There are at least 
three distinct rationales for affirmative action, and the practice as 
conceived under two of those rationales is not readily susceptible to the 
racial profiling analogy and is not inconsistent with the Principle of 
Treatment as an Individual. 
One possible justification of affirmative action is the race-as-proxy 
rationale. This justification for affirmative action says that institutions 
have reason to give favorable consideration to minority racial status 
insofar as that status is meaningfully correlated—i.e., serves as a 
proxy—for some other characteristic that is directly relevant to 
applicable selection criteria.65 The second is the diversity rationale, 
which says that schools and employers have reason to give favorable 
consideration to minority racial status because the presence of racial 
diversity in student bodies and workplaces has consequences that 
benefit the internal goals and values of the school or employer.66 Third 
is the remedial justification: schools and employers may have reason to 
give favorable consideration to an applicant’s minority racial status 
when doing so would reverse or correct the selection effects of their 
own prior practices of objectionable discrimination.67 Each of these 
rationales is subject to different analysis vis-à-vis the requirement of 
individual consideration and prioritizing persons over groups. 
The race-as-proxy version of affirmative action is the version that 
critics who claim an equivalence between affirmative action and racial 
profiling tend to posit.68 Typically, the critic will claim that affirmative 
 
 65.  Cf. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
2059, 2062 (1996). 
 66.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (suggesting that the Supreme Court 
has neither endorsed nor rejected the diversity rationale as a justification for affirmative action 
under Title VII). 
 67.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277–78 (1986); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 
215 (1979); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Local 28 of the 
Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1986) (discussing judicial power 
under Title VII to order affirmative action as remedy following a finding of discrimination). See 
generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative 
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3–4 (2005). 
 68.  Recall the title of the essay that I discussed earlier: “Proxy War.” See Brus, supra note 
61, at 261. 
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action is premised upon regarding race as a proxy for some other trait, 
such as “racial victimization, poverty, [or] cultural deprivation.”69 And, 
as the criticism usually goes, the correlation is specious.70 
This is the sort of thought that may have been behind Justice Alito’s 
line of questioning during oral argument in the first round of Fisher v. 
University of Texas.71 In that exchange, Justice Alito asked the 
University to consider a hypothetical in which “you have two 
applicants who are absolutely the same in every respect . . . [and] both 
come from affluent backgrounds,” but one is a racial minority and one 
is not.72 Why, Justice Alito asked, should we think that this hypothetical 
minority applicant “deserve[s] a leg-up” in the admissions process?73 
Implicit in the question is an assumption that affirmative action seeks 
to give a leg-up to minorities, because minorities tend to come from 
social circumstances that place them at an unfair disadvantage relative 
to non-minority applicants. In other words, Justice Alito assumed that 
affirmative action relies on racial minority status as a proxy for unfair 
social disadvantage. This is why he sees the affluent minority applicant 
as a problematic case for affirmative action proponents: it is a case in 
which the assumed proxy relationship fails to hold. 
As noted, the race-as-proxy rationale tends to be more often 
articulated by critics than by proponents of affirmative action. Thus, the 
real action in the contemporary affirmative action debate lies 
elsewhere. But it is still useful to think about whether race-as-proxy-
based affirmative action violates the Principle of Treatment as an 
Individual. The assumption that a person comes from poverty or has 
been victimized by discrimination may be true or false, but those are 
factors largely outside the realm of autonomy or choice, insofar as no 
one controls the socioeconomic conditions into which one is born. Thus, 
falsely assuming those things about a person based on his or her race 
may not necessarily disparage his or her past autonomous choices or 
future capacity for choice. But erroneously assuming, because of a 
person’s race, that he grew up in challenging social circumstances is 
likely to be the result of stereotypical associations between minority 
status and choices or behaviors that contribute to the condition of 
 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995). 
 71.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 72.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (No. 11-345). 
 73.  Id. at 44. 
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poverty. Obviously, that kind of linkage is an insult to personal 
autonomy. The use of race as a proxy for low socio-economic status is 
also open to the additional objections that the proxy relationship is not 
sufficiently strong to be relied on; and even if it were, since it is not clear 
what benefit would be gained by relying on the proxy of race rather 
than giving positive consideration directly to applicants who meet that 
description, there is no good reason to rely on the proxy.74 
A slightly different version of the race-as-proxy rationale regards 
race as a proxy for particular viewpoints that could add to the richness 
of discourse in an otherwise all-white classroom, or perhaps a 
contrarian voice that could reduce blind spots or promote out-of-the-
box thinking in workplace teams and management deliberations.75 
Being a member of a minority racial group is a proxy, on this view, for 
a propensity to contribute a dissenting, nonconforming, or contrarian 
voice to discourse or teamwork that would otherwise be dominated by 
orthodoxy and groupthink. This rationale is also vulnerable to the 
objection that it violates the Principle of Individual Consideration, 
interpreted in light of the requirement of respecting the autonomy of 
individuals. The rationale regards a person’s capacity to make valuable 
contributions to discourse and deliberation as in part a function of the 
person’s race. When we say that a person’s minority racial status gives 
us reason to believe that the person will express a certain set of 
viewpoints or engage in certain modes of discourse, we treat the 
person’s thoughts, beliefs, and ways of relating to others – which some 
would argue lie at the heart of the capacity to make autonomous 
choices – as determined by something external to the person’s agency. 
Assuming that a person will bring underrepresented viewpoints to a 
discourse because that person is an underrepresented minority fails to 
respect that person as an individual, because it implicitly repudiates the 
person’s autonomous capacity to think and speak in ways that might 
not be expected.76 Affirmative action, to the extent conceived in terms 
of the race-as-proxy-for-discourse-enhancing-potential rationale, 
violates the requirement of individual consideration in ways that are 
closely analogous to racial profiling. 
 
 74.  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, On Class-Not-Race, in A NATION OF WIDENING 
OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50 (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz, eds., 2015) 
(describing the argument). 
 75.  See Volokh, supra note 65. 
 76.  See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 621 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the use of “race as a proxy” for underrepresented viewpoints is “the hallmark of an 
unconstitutional policy”). 
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The diversity rationale for affirmative action is the only one that 
has been given constitutional validity by the Supreme Court in the 
university admissions context.77 Although critics tend to conflate the 
diversity rationale and one or both versions of the race-as-proxy 
rationale, they are distinct. According to the diversity rationale, the 
existence of racial diversity in a population activates certain benefits 
for all individuals in the hosting community.78 The premise is not that 
race is a stand-in for some other quality or trait that then produces the 
benefit. Instead, the idea is that the existence of racial diversity itself is 
a condition that operates on human social psychology in such a way as 
to result in improved learning environments, reduction of bias and 
stereotypes, improved productivity in a workplace setting,79 and so on.80 
The diversity rationale is not completely free from worries from the 
standpoint of treating people as individuals. There may be a concern 
that admitting a minority student in order to activate certain 
institutional benefits associated with diversity is tantamount to using 
the student in the same way that a catalyst might be used to trigger a 
desired chemical reaction. Valuing the student for the contribution he 
makes to racial diversity may be to regard the student as a “de-biasing” 
instrument rather than as an individual with a history of autonomous 
choices and a capacity to make future autonomous choices. And 
furthermore, even if the presence of a minority student has the 
beneficial effects intended, one might argue that those benefits come 
about as a result of psychological processes that largely lie outside of a 
person’s autonomous control. 
But at the same time, if there is indeed a worry here, it does not 
seem to be quite the same as the concern implicated in Eidelson’s 
hypotheticals or in racial profiling. There is a difference between (a) 
predicting the actions that a person will perform based on his racial 
group membership and (b) predicting how a person’s presence, in light 
of his racial group membership, will affect the social psychological 
dynamics of a given community. Whereas (a) invokes racial 
classification in a way that tends to displace the significance of the 
person’s autonomous choices, (b) is more a claim that awareness of race 
 
 77.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
 78.  See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210. 
 79.  The diversity rationale has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court as a basis for 
affirmative action under Title VII. 
 80.  See Patrick Shin & Mitu Gulati, Cultivating Inclusion, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 117, 120 (2014). 
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can, through the operation of our psychologies, have an effect on the 
quality of our autonomous choices. 
Although the diversity rationale may imply that affirmative action 
entails using people as passive instruments in some sense, this does not 
necessarily violate the Principle of Treatment as an Individual, as long 
as all admitted students are also valued for the qualities that are 
associated with aspects of their autonomous agency. Certainly, there is 
nothing in Eidelson’s account that implies that treating someone as an 
individual requires valuing a person only for those qualities over which 
the person exercises autonomous choice. Thus, even if the diversity 
rationale may involve viewing a person’s racial group membership in 
an instrumental way, it does not necessarily entail the treatment of 
individuals in a way that fails to respect their autonomy. 
Furthermore, if one takes seriously the educational benefits of 
diversity, one can appreciate a more positive relation between 
affirmative action and treating persons as individuals. The point of 
affirmative action, according to the diversity rationale, is that a diverse 
student body or workplace provides a context in which people can 
develop more robust connections and collaborations with a wider 
variety of individuals.81 The more that stereotypes are broken down and 
bias reduced, the more it becomes possible for people to mutually 
recognize and respect others not as mere predictable functions of their 
given social circumstances, but as individuals with a history of 
autonomous choices and a capacity to exercise their autonomy in the 
future. Populating a community in such a way as to foster beneficial 
racial dynamics helps create conditions in which every member can 
flourish in the exercise of their individual agency and learn to respect 
the individuality of others. From this perspective, affirmative action 
according to the diversity rationale ultimately seeks to realize the value 
of treating people as individuals, even if it also assumes that people are 
partly the product of psychological processes that they do not entirely 
control. 
Of the three rationales for affirmative action, the remedial 
justification for affirmative action is in some ways the most intriguing. 
It contradicts the Principle of Treatment as an Individual more 
explicitly than the other two, and yet remains the only justification that 
has so far been accepted by the Supreme Court in employment cases 
 
 81.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and 
Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 206–07, 233–34 (2005). 
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under Title VII (private employment) or the Equal Protection Clause 
(public).82 The remedial justification permits institutional actors to take 
race-conscious steps to eradicate current distributional patterns that 
are traceable to the institution’s own past discrimination.83 In effect, it 
allows employers to give preference to members of particular racial 
groups for the sake of improving local conditions of group inequality. 
This seems to fly in the face of the Principle of Individual Priority, the 
second prong of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual.84 
At root, the Principle of Individual Priority is an affirmation of the 
modern concept of individual rights. The basic idea, familiar from 
contemporary liberal political philosophy, is that basic individual rights 
and liberties are lexically prior to considerations of distributive 
equality. Everyone must be guaranteed equal rights and liberties before 
any redistribution can be undertaken; and a person’s rights and 
liberties cannot be part of what is redistributed for the sake of equality 
or group interests. They are, to that extent, inviolable. This is not to say 
that individual rights can never be justifiably infringed for the sake of 
group interests, but individual rights would amount to little if they 
could not generally withstand the countervailing pressures of collective 
welfare or intergroup equality. The relevant point for purposes of the 
present discussion is that the Principle of Individual Priority is closely 
tied to this notion of the inviolability of rights as against claims of group 
welfare. 
Notice that the remedial justification for affirmative action is not 
directly inconsistent with the Principle of Individual Consideration (as 
distinguished from the Principle of Individual Priority). Giving racial 
minorities a preference in selection decisions to reverse “manifest 
racial imbalance[s]”85 caused by prior discrimination does not entail 
 
 82.  There is some dispute about whether United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) 
and Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987) restrict affirmative action 
under Title VII to purposes that are truly “remedial.” For an argument that they do, see Estlund, 
supra note 67, at 3–5. For the view that Weber and Johnson may permit affirmative action under 
Title VII that is not strictly remedial, see Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the 
Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 274 (2003).  
 83.  Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504–05, 509 (1989).  
 84.  In cases that are “remedial” in the strictest sense – where a defendant is found liable for 
discrimination and race-conscious measures are imposed as a judicial remedy – the plaintiffs can 
be regarded as having a legal right to the race-conscious remedial measure. See Regents of Univ. 
of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to argue 
that the race-conscious remedy violates any right of individual treatment, since the remedy itself 
becomes embodied as an individual right. But cases like Weber and the context of higher 
education generally speaking do not present remedial scenarios in this strict sense. 
 85.  See Weber, 443 U.S. at 209. 
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any racially-derived inference that would be inconsistent with respect 
for anyone’s autonomy as an agent. The basis of such a remedial 
preference is not any generalization about the traits or dispositions of 
members of a group, but rather the desirability of correcting the 
consequences of past discriminatory practices that, if allowed to 
remain, would stand as an enduring emblem of the employer’s past 
failures to respect all persons as individuals.86 
There does appear to be a rather direct conflict, however, between 
the remedial justification for affirmative action and the individual 
priority component of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual. 
Race-conscious measures that are designed to correct “imbalances” 
effectively impose a disadvantage on some individuals for the sake of 
reducing intergroup disparities. This violates the Principle of Individual 
Priority.87 Why, then, should remedial affirmative action (as in Weber) 
be permitted? 
Just as we compared racial profiling and suspect description to tease 
out how they might be distinguished vis-à-vis the Principle of 
Individual Consideration, it is useful to explore how remedial 
affirmative action is different from a related practice that is clearly 
impermissible under principles of individual treatment: the use of 
quotas. To be clear, one should note that quotas are a mechanism for 
producing racial balance or diversity, while the remedial justification 
for affirmative action is a rationale for race-conscious action; so the two 
practices are in some sense orthogonal. But it is nevertheless instructive 
to ask, if remedial affirmative action of the kind discussed in Weber is 
legally permissible, then why not quotas? Suppose, for example, that a 
university with a regrettably low population of black students decides 
to adopt an admissions policy that sets aside a fixed number of seats 
 
 86.  See id. at 204; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 637 
(1987). 
 87.  In some ways, the remedial justification can be seen as a limited concession to Owen 
Fiss’s anti-subordination theory of equal treatment, according to which affirmative action would 
be permissible to the extent that it alleviated group inequality and stratification. See Owen M. 
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (suggesting 
that a law or practice should be regarded as violating constitutional principles of equality only if 
it “aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group”). 
The Supreme Court’s insistence on the Principle of Individual Priority is an explicit rejection of 
Fiss’s anti-subordination approach. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 
223–30 (1995); see also Michael C. Dorf, A Partial Defense of an Anti-Discrimination Principle, in 
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY 
(2002) (characterizing Fiss’s theory as a “period piece, a relic of a more egalitarian but bygone 
era”). 
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for black students88 for the purpose of increasing the diversity of its 
student body. Such a policy would certainly be a legally impermissible89 
example of failing to respect the priority of the individual over groups.90 
But what are the underlying moral concerns? 
The Supreme Court has asserted that the problem with this kind of 
quota is that it deprives white applicants, solely on the basis of their 
race, of the opportunity to compete for the seats reserved for black 
applicants, while black applicants are permitted to compete for all of 
the seats without limitation.91 But the practical effect of this 
purportedly unfair competition boils down to nothing more than a 
reduction of the admissions chances of white applicants relative to 
black applicants. In that regard, it is hard to see a clear distinction 
between quota-based affirmative action and post-Grutter policies 
based on holistic review. An effective holistic affirmative action policy 
will also have the effect of reducing the admissions chances of whites 
relative to blacks (otherwise, the policy would be pointless); and a 
holistic policy that gives significant weight to race could theoretically 
reduce white admission rates even more than a modest quota-based 
policy. 
The objections that truly drive the law’s resistance to quotas lie not 
in any diminishment of opportunity for majority racial groups, but 
rather in the perceived risk of negative social consequences associated 
with their use and, just as importantly, their symbolic meaning. There is, 
first, a fear that if the law were to permit the use of racial quotas, this 
would deepen racial divisions in society, create racial resentment, and 
perpetuate discriminatory attitudes.92 The problem with quotas, 
according to this perspective, is that they are likely to result in “racial 
balkanization.”93 
Second, quotas symbolize a sort of insensitivity to individual 
differences within groups. What seems to trouble the Court is that in a 
system of set-asides, people can feel as though they are “reduced to 
 
 88.  This hypothetical policy is similar to the one that was invalidated in Bakke. See Regents 
of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 278–79 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 89.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (asserting that fixed set-asides amount to “outright racial 
balancing, which is patently unconstitutional”). 
 90.  See Julie C. Suk, Quotas and Consequences, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 232 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013). 
 91.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319–20. 
 92.  See Suk, supra note 90, at 233–35 (discussing consequentialist arguments against quotas). 
 93.  See id.  
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pure numbers,” to use Justice Kennedy’s language in Fisher II.94 Quotas 
by their nature emphasize quantity as a decisive consideration. The 
emphasis on quantity evokes a process in which the predominant mode 
of evaluation is counting. And the notion of counting to fill a quota 
strongly connotes the fungibility of the members of each quota-limited 
group. It is perhaps understandable, then, that an adverse selection 
decision in a quota-based system might be experienced as a denial of 
respect for individuals, especially in contexts such as higher education 
where success tends to be associated with personal achievement, 
character, and promise.95 A quota-driven rejection might very well feel 
to the unsuccessful white applicant as if it were predicated upon a 
negative inference about the applicant’s individual character based on 
his race. From the applicant’s perspective, the rejection could be 
interpreted as a violation not only of the Principle of Individual 
Priority, but also of the Principle of Individual Consideration. 
Thus, although the Supreme Court has authorized race conscious 
affirmative action to remedy significant intergroup imbalances that are 
the vestiges of past discriminatory wrongs (such as in Weber), quotas 
remain an impermissible form of such action, because they violate not 
only the Principle of Individual Priority, but they are also contrary to 
the norms of respect that underlie the Principle of Individual 
Consideration. This suggests that race-conscious action that conflicts 
with the Principle of Individual Priority may be permitted when 
necessary to correct significant inequalities of opportunity attributable 
to known past practices of discrimination with respect to those specific 
opportunities,96 but only by means of policies that are sufficiently 
tempered (in duration and manner of implementation) so as not to 
“unnecessarily trammel the interests”97 of non-minorities or evince 
disrespect for individuals. 
This conclusion is in some ways similar to the analysis I suggested 
in the context of racial profiling in law enforcement. There, I argued 
that adherence to the Principle of Individual Consideration requires 
 
 94.  136 S. Ct. at 2210. 
 95.  See Suk, supra note 90, at 231. Suk quotes Alexander Bickel’s strong condemnation of 
quotas: “[A] racial quota derogates the human dignity and individual of all to whom it is applied.” 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1974). 
 96.  The Supreme Court has been adamant to reject affirmative action as a remedy for 
“societal discrimination.” See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 731 (2007); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). To allow race-conscious 
action whenever necessary to correct disparities attributable to societal discrimination generally 
would eviscerate the Principle of Individual Priority, since such disparities are ubiquitous.  
 97.  Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
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ascribing irrelevance to statistical considerations that might very well 
be epistemically valid reasons for the allocation of limited law 
enforcement and monitoring resources. In a somewhat similar way, 
adherence to the Principle of Individual Consideration requires the 
rejection of quotas, even though they might be an effective way of 
accomplishing an otherwise permissible remedial purpose of reducing 
local group inequalities that stand as vestiges of past discrimination. 
CONCLUSION: AUTONOMY AND EQUALITY 
The oft-repeated dictum that antidiscrimination law guarantees 
individual consideration and protects “persons, not groups” can be 
fleshed out as a compound principle. This principle prohibits treatment 
of persons based on inferences derived from a person’s classification in 
certain enumerated categories and prohibits reliance on 
generalizations about groups defined by those classifications, and 
invalidates justifications of the treatment of persons that appeal to 
group interests or conditions of intergroup equality. I have tried to 
show that this framework of constraints is underwritten by a 
fundamental commitment to a moral requirement of taking people 
seriously as individuals – autonomous actors who are shaped by their 
own past choices and have the capacity to exercise their future agency 
in ways that are not merely a function of the social contexts they 
occupy, combined with a commitment to the concept of individual 
rights as bulwarks against countervailing interests of collective welfare 
or intergroup equality. 
A notable aspect of my account of the Principle of Individual 
Consideration and Individual Priority is that it suggests that these are 
noncomparative concepts98 of respect for autonomy and the 
inviolability of individual rights. They are not truly principles of 
equality, even though they tend to be frequently invoked as 
commitments of the Equal Protection Clause. Chief Justice Roberts in 
Parents Involved invoked the “persons not groups” principle in a 
crucial step of his argument. But in the last part of his opinion, he also 
quoted from a case in which the Court had said that the problem with 
treating someone differently based on racial group membership is that 
it “demeans the [person’s] dignity and worth.”99 I do not think that the 
language of dignity occurred accidentally here. Rather, I think that 
 
 98.  For an illuminating discussion of the difference between comparative and 
noncomparative conceptions of discrimination, see Hellman, supra note 11. 
 99.  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)). 
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Justice Roberts invoked the value of dignity because that value is 
intimately connected to respect for autonomy and the inviolability of 
rights, which in turn, as I have argued, is what underlies the two 
components of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual. 
If that Principle is ultimately a manifestation of respect for 
autonomy and the inviolability of rights, rather than a principle of 
equality, it becomes easier to explain why the Principle can seem 
sometimes at odds with the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow the 
use of racial classifications in the context of diversity-based affirmative 
action and especially remedial affirmative action. The justification of 
affirmative action policies is rooted in concerns about distributive 
equality and remediation of group subordination. Affirmative action, I 
have suggested, is not necessarily inconsistent with respect for 
autonomy, but the need for such policies is a reflection of the limits of 
noncomparative, autonomy- and rights-based approaches to solving 
the problem of entrenched social inequality.100 
Finally, the discussion of this article shows that the principles of 
individual consideration and individual priority are not self-contained, 
self-justifying theorems of antidiscrimination law. These principles limit 
themselves, more or less by brute force, to the specific categories that 
are enumerated as problematic, either in legislative enactments (e.g. 
Title VII) or in the Court’s common law constitutional jurisprudence 
(e.g. “suspect classification” doctrine). These categories cannot be 
somehow logically derived from considerations that are completely 
internal to the principles of individual treatment themselves. Rather, 
they can only be explained with reference to historically contingent 
patterns of unjust deprivation, concerns about enduring inequalities, 
and the politics and priorities of social reform movements.101 The point, 
again, is not that the Principle of Treatment as an Individual is wrong 
as far as it goes, but rather that it cannot itself explain 
antidiscrimination law in its entirety. Indeed, it is the other way around: 
it takes a theory of discrimination and equality to explain certain 
aspects of the Principle. The Principle of Treatment as an Individual, 
underwritten by the value of respect for autonomy and the inviolability 
of rights, may capture an important strand of antidiscrimination law, 
but it cannot by itself purport to be exhaustive of it. 
 
 
 100.  See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 767 (2011). 
 101.  See Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 846–48; see also Shin, supra note 12, at 169–72. 
